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ABSTRACT:  What evolutionary advantages have shaped the human capacity 
for mood? Answers are suggested if moods are seen as specialized states 
that increase our ability to cope with certain situations. This target 
article considers the hypothesis that high mood helps individuals take 
full advantage of the opportunities in propitious situations, whereas 
low mood motivates them to seek help, be socially submissive, conserve 
resources, and consider alternative strategies in situations where 
investments are not paying off. 
 
RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING PEER COMMENTARY: The "skywriting" format 
requires paring away all but the skeleton of the argument and 
unfortunately allows few citations. Nonetheless, the format is 
excellent for my goal of encouraging psychiatrists, psychologists, and 
evolutionists to recognize that the question, "What is mood for?" is 
legitimate, important, and answerable. I would especially appreciate 
comments about (1) the basic approach of seeking evolutionary 
explanations for emotions in the adaptive challenges of the situations 
that shaped them, (2) alternative hypotheses about the functions of 
mood, (3) the plausibility of the "propitiousness hypothesis" and 
(4) additional ways in which it can be tested. 
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 What function, if any, is served by the capacity for high and low 
moods? The development of new psychotropic drugs makes this question 
more important, and recent advances in evolutionary approaches to 
behavior make it more tractable. I shall (1) briefly justify the 
attempt to understand the evolutionary functions of mood, (2) review 
major proposals about the functions of mood, and (3) attempt to show 
how these proposals fit within a broader hypothesis. 
  
The trait to be explained is high and low mood, that is, ordinary 
happiness and sadness. These are addressed as a single trait because 
their characteristics appear to be opposite sides of the same coin, and 
because their brain regulation mechanisms are closely related, as 
demonstrated in manic-depressive illness. Mania, depression, and grief 
are not primary objects of explanation here because it is difficult to 
tell whether they are sub-specialized adaptations, exaggerations of 
normal responses, or pathological states unrelated to normal mood. 
  
It is now recognized that biological traits require evolutionary 
explanations of their origins and functions as well as proximate 
explanations of their mechanisms and ontogeny (Mayr, 1983). Debates 
continue, however, about how to decide whether or not a trait is an 
adaptation, how to specify the functions of a trait, what kinds of 
evidence are admissible, how evidence should be marshalled, and the 
degree of optimality shaped by natural selection (Sober, 1984). These 
debates are useful, but so far there is no sign of early consensus. In 
the meantime, it is essential that we continue, as best we can, to 
propose and test hypotheses about specific traits. 
  
There are several good reasons to think that the capacity for mood was 
shaped by natural selection and that it therefore requires an 
evolutionary explanation. First, mood is a complex, universal trait and 
thus unlikely to be a product of drift, simple mutation, or any process 
other than natural selection. Second, the brain mechanisms that 
regulate mood could have been shaped only for a trait that was itself 
an adaptation. Third, mood responds in predictable ways to specific 
situations. Finally, mood consists of stable constellations of 
behavioral, physiological and cognitive states that have obvious major 
impact on fitness. These arguments do not prove that mood has an 
evolutionary explanation, but they justify the search, especially since 
the best evidence that a trait is indeed an adaptation is the discovery 
of its function. 
  
Two main functions have been proposed for mood: communication and 
motivation. Mood has been thought (1) to communicate either a need for 
assistance or an individual's rank in a group, and (2) to motivate and 
regulate the timing and locus of effort. 
  
Of the two communicative functions of mood, eliciting aid is the more 
straightforward. The infant's cry alerts the care-giver that something 
is amiss. Later, the toddler's crying signal's separation and motivates 
the parent and child to stay together, as described by Bowlby and 
Harlow (Bowlby,1969). In adulthood, expressions of sadness solicit aid 
from relatives and friends. Many authors have noted that low mood can 
also be used deceptively to manipulate others. The solicitation of aid 
cannot, however, explain all aspects of mood. In particular, it cannot 
readily explain the benefits of happiness, or the physiological and 
cognitive changes of high and low mood. Furthermore, if the only 
function of mood is communication, it is difficult to explain the 
intensity of moods that are experienced alone in the middle of the 
night. 
  
Mood also communicates social rank. High mood communicates dominance, low 
mood, submissiveness, and these signals prevent useless fights that would 
only harm both combatants. John Price has long advocated this function for 
mood (Price, 1967), and support has come from others (Gardner, 1982). In 
vervet monkeys, lowered status decreases activity in serotonergic brain 
mechanisms and the administration of serotonergic antidepressants can 
increase dominance rank (Raleigh, McGuire, Brammer, Pollack, & Yuwiler, 
1991). Low mood motivates behavior to placate dominants, while high 
mood motivates high-status individuals to act in ways that maintain and 
increase their position in the hierarchy. Although mood undoubtedly 
serves these functions, several simple observations suggest that this 
cannot be its only role: some events that profoundly influence mood do 
not involve social position, some low-status people are happy, and many 
high-status people are unhappy. 
  
Mood also has motivational and regulatory functions. One function is to 
adjust the timing of effort. When investments are not paying off, it is 
wise to stop investing in order to conserve efforts for a later time. 
The "conservation-withdrawal response" fits in this category (Engel & 
Schmale, 1972), as do analogies between low mood and hibernation. Less 
well appreciated are the benefits that high mood offers by increasing 
investments at times of high payoff. 
  
The other motivational function of mood is to regulate the locus of 
investment. If a strategy is not paying off, or if a goal seems 
unattainable, it is wise not only to conserve resources for a more 
propitious time, but also to reconsider the viability of the strategy. 
Emmy Gut takes this argument the farthest with her suggestion that 
depression is an adaptation that motivates social withdrawal in order 
to facilitate a reconsideration of how or whether to pursue receding 
goals (Gut, 1989). This would explain Bibring's observation that 
depression arises from the inability to give up unattainable goals 
(Bibring, 1953). Behaviorists propose a similar function in describing 
reactions to decreased reinforcement. The maladaptive aspects of 
Seligman's helplessness-hopelessness response have been emphasized 
(Seligman, 1975), but its foundations may lie in the benefits of not 
wasting time and energy on futile efforts. 
  
These four functions of mood are all correct, in part, but none is 
sufficient. An explicitly evolutionary approach suggests a broad 
hypothesis that integrates the functions of mood. Like other emotions, 
high and low mood are behavioral subroutines, specialized states that 
have been shaped to increase fitness in certain situations. An 
evolutionary explanation of an emotion does not just consist of 
describing its functions. Instead, the explanation must first specify 
the situations in which the emotion offers advantages, and then show 
how the emotion's characteristics increase fitness in the face of the 
specific adaptive challenges that arise in those situations (Nesse, 
1990, 1991). The characteristics of fear, for example, are useful in 
situations that are dangerous. Mood is more complicated.  Because it is 
a continuum from high to low, we must look, not for a single situation, 
but for some varying aspect of the environment whose different levels 
require different behavioral strategies. This approach follows the 
behavioral ecological model of searching for the environmental cues and 
cognitive mechanisms that regulate various aspects of behavior (Krebs & 
Davies, 1984). A primary goal is discover what environmental variable 
is tracked by mood. 
  
The environmental variable that seems most likely to regulate mood is 
the perceived propitiousness of current circumstances. In propitious 
situations, small investments have a high likelihood of a large payoff. 
In unpropitious situations, any amount of effort is likely to be 
wasted. The propitiousness of a situation influences mood, which in 
turn adjusts cognition, physiology, and behavior in coordinated ways 
that increase the ability to cope effectively with the situation at 
hand. Propitious situations induce high mood, which communicates high 
or increasing status, motivates increased energy and risk-taking in 
order to get full advantage from short-lived opportunities, and 
motivates increased investment in whatever strategies are working well. 
If the opportunity is social, the confidence of high mood motivates new 
relationships and status challenges that are risky but that might now 
pay off. Unpropitious situations induce low mood, which communicates 
the need for aid and submissive social withdrawal, and motivates 
conserving resources and considering other possible strategies or 
goals. When a previously rewarding strategy suddenly stops paying off, 
frustration induces a short burst of aggressive energy to see whether 
additional effort is likely to overcome the obstacle. If not, 
hopelessness may be adaptive when it leads to considering other 
opportunities. 
  
In sum, mood seems to motivate the allocation of resources away from 
efforts where they will be wasted, and towards those times, strategies, 
and enterprises where investments will have a large payoff. In this 
sense, mood is an algorithm that shapes major life strategies by 
determining how resources are allocated. Making such decisions well is 
as crucial to human Darwinian fitness as it is for other animals. Most 
animals must decide which prey to pursue and how long to stay in each 
patch. For humans (and for other social species), resource allocation 
decisions are inordinately complex, because they involve multiple 
goals, many individuals and groups, and networks of potentially 
incompatible strategies. Resources, for humans, are mostly social 
resources. Our investments are mostly in friends, allies and groups, 
and the rewards we seek are likewise mostly social. This explains why 
social cues so profoundly affect mood, why social withdrawal so 
regularly characterizes low mood, and why gregariousness characterizes 
high mood. 
  
In addition to providing a framework that integrates previously 
proposed functions of mood, this hypothesis makes several predictions. 
First, the effects of different environmental situations on mood should 
be proportional to their effects on anticipated propitiousness. This 
contrasts with the simpler view that moods are affected by gains and 
losses and suggests the non-obvious prediction that the effects on mood 
should be small when gains are not accompanied by new opportunities and 
when losses involve no loss of future rewards per unit of investment. 
Second, the characteristics of high and low mood should offer 
advantages in situations of high and low propitiousness, respectively. 
Several such functions have been mentioned, but much remains to be done 
to understand how the characteristics of mood offer benefits. Third, 
people who lack the capacity for mood should be at a disadvantage 
compared to normal people. Those who lack the capacity for happiness 
should be unable to take advantage of opportunities, while those who 
lack the capacity for sadness should persist, blithely, in efforts that 
offer few payoffs. 
  
This is a bare summary of a longer paper which is in preparation. I do 
not claim that the proposed hypothesis for the functions of mood is 
correct, but only that it is plausible, and that it demonstrates how a 
modern evolutionary approach may increase our understanding of mood. I 
welcome comments, especially those about other hypothesized functions 
of mood that I have not discussed, and ways in which the propitiousness 
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